Warring ants: lessons from Lanchester's laws of combat? by Borges, Renee M.
  
75 
 
 
J. Biosci. | Vol. 27 | No. 2 | March 2002 | 75–78 | © Indian Academy of Sciences     
 
Warring ants: Lessons from Lanchester’s laws of combat? 
For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he 
have sufficient to finish it? 
Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to 
mock him, 
Saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish. 
Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether 
he be able with ten thousand to meet him that co eth against him with twenty thousand? 
 
Luke, 14: 28–30 
 
F W Lanchester (1868–1946) was a man of many talents. This British engineer not only built the first 
car in Britain in 1895, but made significant contributions to aeronautics (e.g. the Lanchester–Prandtl 
general equations of flight), operations research and military strategy. In fact, there is an annual prize 
offered in his name by the Operations Research Society of America. But perhaps, more importantly, 
Lanchester is remembered for his insights into military tactics. His book Aircraft in Warfare: the 
Dawn of the Fourth Arm written in 1916 just before World War I laid down laws of combat which 
involved insights using force strengths in terms of numbers, fighting capabilities of individual soldiers 
or weapons, and the concentrations of forces. Lanchester considered aircraft as a fourth type of 
military force after cavalry, infantry nd artillery and hence the title of his book.
 Lanchester divided warfare into two basic types: ancient and modern. Of the former type he says: 
In olden times, when weapon directly answered weapon, the act of defense was positive and direct, 
the blow of sword or battle- x was parried by sword and shiel . Under the old conditions, it was not 
possible by any strategic plan or tactical maneuver to bring other than approximately equal numbers 
of combatants into the actual firing line; one man would ordinarily end himself opposed by one man. 
Even were a general to concentrate twice the number of men on any given portion of the field to that 
of the enemy, the number of men actually wielding their weapons at any given time, was, roughly 
speaking, the same on both sides (Lanchester 1916). 
 Based on this line of reasoning, Lanchester came up with a Linear Law of combat which says that 
the chances of winning depend therefore not so much on numbers of attacking units but more 
importantly on the effectiveness of each attacking unit especially if the battle is actually composed of 
a series of duels. This is how the Lanchester Linear Law may be derived. Let mand n be the numbers 
of opposing forces M and N at time t. Let b and a be the fighting ability of one unit of force M and N. 
The rate of attri ion of the two sides is calculated as: dm/dt = – am and dn/dt = – bm (where m < n). 
Therefore dm/dn = a/b, dm = (a/b)dn, and bdm = adn. Integrating from time 0 to time t, b(m–m0) = 
a(n–n0). When side M wins, n = 0. Therefore, m = m0 – a/b(n0). Consequently, side M will win if m0 
> a/b(n0). This means that if m0 = n0 to begin with, then sideM can only win if the fighting ability of 
each unit of M is greater than that of each unit of N. This is a straightforward commonsensical result 
if the battle is set up as a set of duels. 
 Lanchester then dealt with combat situation  h  he likened to modern warfare. In this case every 
unit of side M can inflict damage on every unit of side N at the same time, which means that a 
concentration of forces will be a much better strategy. For example, in the earlier linear situation of 
duels, arraying 100 attacking units against 50 units would not have any particular advantage. 
However, in a modern warfare context, concentrating 100 units against 50 would be a decided 
advantage as each unit of the enemy force would be attacked by two units of the ther side. In 
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situations such as these, could a smaller force win over a larger force? This could be achieved if the 
smaller force divided up the larger force by tactical manoeuvres into two parts and then concentrated 
its attack on each part separately. To derive the rate of attrition according to the conditions of modern 
warfare, similar equations apply. Here, dm/dt = – an, and dn/dt = – bm. Therefore, dm/dn = (a/b)n/m, 
which leads to mdm = (a/b) ndn. Integrating this from time 0 to time t, m2–m0
2   = (a/b)n2–n0
2  .  
When side M wins, n = 0. Rearranging, m2 = m0
2   – (a/b)n0
2  . Therefore, m = Ö(m0
2   – a/bn0
2  ). This is 
Lanchester’s Square Law. On examination of this law it can seen that for side M o win, the condition 
m0 > (a/b)n0
2   must apply. This means that even if each unit of side N ha  25 times or a/b times the 
fighting value of each unit of side M, side M has merely to have 5 times or Ö(a/b) times the number 
of attacking units of side N to match the fighting strength of side N. This is an important result with 
predictive value if a/b is known. 
 What about the strategy in which the smaller side divides up the larger side and then concentrates 
on smaller enemy subsets sequentially? A famous example is Nelson’s strategy at Trafalgar. In the 
Battle of Trafalgar (21 October 1805), Lord Nelson won a famous victory over the combined French 
and Spanish fleets. Nelson split the enemy fleet into two using a small subset of his fleet; then the 
larger subset engaged the two portions of the enemy fleet separately. This ended in the capture of 20 
enemy ships by the English. Was this a lucky accident or the outcome of a carefully planned strategy? 
Apparently this was a premeditated ploy (Franks and Partridge 1994). In a memo Nelson wrote on 9 
October 1805, he assumed that his entire fleet of 40 ships would encounter the larger French and 
Spanish fleet consisting of 46 ships. He decided that he would use 8 ships to split the enemy fleet into 
two sections; he would then use his remaining 32 ships to destroy the first half of the fleet, and 
engage the second half later. He thus felt that he would be able to increase his odds of destroying a 
greater proportion of the enemy fleet. In retrospect, it appears as if Nelson was using Lanchester’s 
Square Law of combat. If the fighting ability of each combat unit of the two warring sides was equal, 
then applying Lanchester’s Square Law, the French and Spanish fleet could be expected to win with 
23 survivors [Ö(462–402)]. However if Nelson employed 8 ships to split the enemy fleet into two equal 
parts, the English would have been left with 22 surviving ships [Ö(322–232)]. This figure could also be 
augmented by any survivors of the initial 8 ships; Nelson would thus increase his odds of winning the 
overall battle over those calculated by simultaneously pitting the two entire fleets against each other. 
History proved him right. 
 Lanchester’s Square Law can further be used to show that if the number of combat units or 
combatants is doubled by splitting each into a unit half the size, so that each combat unit now has half 
its original fighting ability, then the number of casualties suffered by the now more numerous side is 
proportionately lowered. Thus a disproportionately greater benefit will be obtained by increasing 
numbers of combat units than by simply increasing the fighting ability of each combat unit, if all 
combat units have equal probability of being engaged with all enemy combatants at the same time. 
The essence of the Lanchester’s two laws of combat appears to be that small combat units can be 
highly successful if they are greatly in the majority and if they encounter the larger units all at once. 
However, if large combat units are greatly outnumbered by smaller units, they can be successful only 
if they engage thsmaller ones in a series of one-to-  fights. 
 Lanchester’s strategies are used in planning several real war games and tactics for deploying forces 
as they lend themselves to precise predictions. They are apparently also being used successfully in 
Japanese business and marketing strategies, an effort th t has been pioneered by Nobuo Taoka (Taoka 
1997). These marketing strategies employ terms such as “local battles”, “close combat”, and “one-
point concentration” in their lexicon (Yano 1996), and focus on offensive and defensive strategies of 
the weak and the strong. For example, advice given to the weak is to fight in only one market, i.e. to 
concentrate forces, and to differentiate to produce better products. The corresponding defensive 
strategies of the strong would be to take the combat to large markes to swamp the offensive efforts of 
the weak, to the extent of even floodi g the market with copycat products as soon as possible. 
Although these are qualitative descriptions, they have been refined into quantitative prescriptions 
(Taoka 1997). This view of business as war has apparently contributed to the success of Japanese 
business and marketing strategies in the post-World War II scenario. Curiously, Taoka was apparently 
inspired by the use of Lanchester’s laws by the US Navy against the Japanese in the Pacific war
arena. 
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 Since competition and therefore some form of combat, is part of the fabric of life, it would be 
interesting to examine how other species organize their battles. For example, do warring ants follow 
Lanchester’s laws? Army ants capture nd overpower organisms many times their size. They appear 
to do so by sheer numbers. In the army ant Eciton burchelli up to 200,000 ants participate in a single 
raid; however, although E. burchelli has four morphological castes, the two smallest castes account 
for 97% of the ants at the raid front (Franks 1982). This would be expected by Lanchester’s Square 
Law as the large numbers of small ants are highly effective. In an experimental study of war games in 
leaf cutting ants, Whitehouse and Jaffe (1996) found that although Atta laevigata has a “soldier” caste 
which is much larger in size, this caste recruits large numbers of smaller castes in response to 
conspecific and interspecific ant threats, in accordance with the Square Law. The functional 
significance of the soldier caste in this species is not yet clearly understood. 
 Lanchester’s Linear Law appears to be followed in slave-making ants which steal brood from 
heterospecific colonies to augment the worker force in their own nests. The slave-makers are usually 
outnumbered by workers in the colonies that they wish to raid. Do the slave-makers try to organize 
one-to-one duels? According to Franks and Partridge (1993) the slave-making ants Formica per-
gandei and F. subintegra which produce “propaganda” or confusing substances (esters such as decyl, 
dodecyl and tetradecyl acetates) that cause alarm amongst the defending workers (Regnier and Wilson 
1971), are actually trying to split the enemy ranks to force limited engagements or one-to-o e duel 
situations. In these duels, victory is ensured by the superior individual fighting ability of the sl ve-
making ants, many of which are equipped with powerful mandibles and stings. Another possible 
example of the use of the Lin ar Law is the slave-making ant Harpagoxenus sublaevis which 
produces the “propaganda” alkanes n-heptadecene and n-heptadecadiene (Ollet et al 1987) that cause 
the defenders to attack each other (Allies et al 1986). 
 In a recent experiment, McGlynn (2000) attempted to test whether ants use Lanchester’s laws in 
interspecific competition at food sources. He designed two types of bait platforms, and conducted 
these experiments in natural settings at the La Selva Biologicl Station in Costa Rica. In one bait 
platform (modified petri dishes), he had large semicircular openings which provided access to the 
bait, while the other had a narrow entrance which provided bait access. McGlynn found that, although 
ants of all sizes were attracted to the baits, smaller ant species significantly dominated the bait 
platforms that has large entry access holes, while there was no clear pattern of domination by ants of 
any particular size at the platforms with the small entry holes. McGlynn (2000) suggests that these 
results may be interpretable from Lanchester’s laws, at least for the results from the smaller ants. 
However, he does caution that other factors such as territoriality, nutritional needs of the colony, nest 
locations, and the suite of competing species near particular bait platform sites, could have contri-
buted to the findings. Considering the very significant result obtained with the bait platforms provided 
with the large openings, McGlynn (2000) suggests that this could be used to design baits platforms to 
administer insecticides for ant control, especially since the problem ants worldwide seem to be small 
non-native invading species (McGlynn 1999). In a comparative study, McGlynn (1999) found that in 
all of the ant genera withmonomorphic worker castes that fight during competition, the non-native 
invasive species were smaller than the native species. He believes that the fact that fighting non-
native ants are smaller than their closest native relatives may prov d  powerful insghts into the mode 
of success of the non- ative invading species. While other factors including life history attributes 
such as polygyny and colony budding, could be responsible for their competitiv ness, it is certainly 
intriguing to consider whether som of this success could be attributed to the fact that the ants are 
following Lanchester’s laws of combat. 
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